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Abstract: This paper explores a special form of international outsourcing 
relationship in which suppliers make recurrent discrete transactions with the 
same buyers over a long period of time without the existence of any  
original legally binding written agreement. The study examines three research 
questions: (1) Can suppliers in such relationships access any of their buyers’ 
tacit knowledge? (2) What implications does their access or the lack thereof 
have for their economic upgrading? (3) What strategies do suppliers adopt to 
compensate for existing knowledge asymmetries? The case analysis of  
three small Bangladeshi garment manufacturers reveals the following key 
findings. The studied firms only have access to their buyers’ explicit/codified 
knowledge. Notwithstanding this, they have successfully developed relevant 
knowledge that has allowed them to engage in process upgrading.  
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1 Introduction 
International business (IB) scholars have traditionally analysed multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) as the key channels for knowledge transfer to their equity partners involved in 
cross-border acquisitions (Bresman et al., 1999; Bresman et al., 2009; Park and Choi, 
2014; Zou and Ghauri, 2008) and joint ventures (Lyles and Salk, 2007; Park, 2011). A 
body of literature within IB focusing on linkages also suggests that the knowledge 
transferred from MNEs may drive local suppliers’ upgrading by directly influencing the 
technology used by them, improving their production function and thus enhancing their 
capabilities (Giroud, 2007; Giroud et al., 2012; Giroud and Scott-Kennel, 2009). Overall, 
studies on knowledge transfer implicitly assume that MNEs are the most important 
sources of knowledge for their supplying partner firms in the host country (cf. Marchi  
et al., 2014). Additional or alternative sources of knowledge (e.g. Fletcher and Harris, 
2012) that may be available to the local firms, and their strategies for acquiring them, are 
frequently untapped. In addition, the knowledge-transfer channels studied so far mostly 
relate to MNE headquarters and their subsidiaries (Foss and Pedersen, 2002; Mudambi  
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and Swift, 2011), foreign direct investment (FDI) and local linkage firms (Giroud, 2007; 
Giroud and Scott-Kennel, 2009), and MNEs and their strategic alliance partners (Ho and 
Wang, 2015). While there has been a rise in externalisation practices such as 
subcontracting and outsourcing/off-shoring by MNEs since the 1980s (Strange and 
Newton, 2006), the IB literature has continued to focus predominantly on the 
perspectives of MNE buyers and only limited attention has been accorded to the 
knowledge acquisition challenges of suppliers. There is still limited understanding of the 
strategies which suppliers adopt to compensate for the knowledge asymmetries in their 
engagement with MNEs. This paper also aims to elucidate the implications of these 
strategies for suppliers’ economic upgrading – a concept borrowed from the global value 
chain (GVC) analysis and defined as ‘a process of improving the ability of a firm to 
move to a more profitable and/or technologically sophisticated capital and skill-intensive 
economic niche’ (Gereffi, 1999, p.38). Thus, the study follows up on recent interest in 
the cross-disciplinary engagement of IB and GVC perspectives (Johns et al., 2015).  
We selected a labour-intensive, low-tech industry context because most existing 
studies related to knowledge-transfer issues between suppliers and their MNE buyers 
have focused on capital-intensive and high-tech industries. In these industries, a greater 
degree of collaboration and knowledge sharing are necessary to create value for the 
buyer, and this can be expected to result, as well, in some sort of value for the supplier 
(Khan and Nicholson, 2014; Sinkovics et al., 2015). For example, Liu and Zhang (2014) 
find that Taiwanese technological suppliers are able to move up the value chain  
by switching from original equipment manufacturing (OEM) to original design 
manufacturing (ODM) or even original brand manufacturing (OBM) as a result of tacit 
knowledge transfer from their MNE buyers. In contrast, the nature of production in 
labour-intensive industry is fairly standardised, codified and requires modest skill 
(Strange and Newton, 2006). The transfer of tacit knowledge, such as design, advertising 
and information technologies, is not needed to create value for MNEs in such industries 
(Ernst and Kim, 2002), although it is essential for suppliers if they are to elevate their 
position in the value chain through economic upgrading in order to achieve higher 
economic rewards (Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003; Tokatli, 2006). These economic 
rewards may include higher profit margins achieved by selling higher-value-added 
goods, supplying to value-conscious buyers who are less price sensitive and thus offer 
better prices, and finally by creating their own brands and global production networks 
(cf. Buckley, 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising that MNEs create high entry barriers to 
suppliers by protecting their tacit knowledge and by reducing unintended leakages to a 
minimum level (Strange and Newton, 2006). As a consequence, suppliers in labour-
intensive low-tech industries face higher barriers to the acquisition of tacit knowledge 
than suppliers from capital-intensive high-tech industries. This paper, therefore, seeks to 
examine whether and how this situation may influence suppliers’ economic upgrading 
initiatives. 
Furthermore, the present study seeks to contribute to the literature by focusing on a, 
to date, largely neglected form of international outsourcing relationship. The findings 
indicate that a number of Bangladeshi garment manufacturers have been producing and 
supplying finished apparel to the same buyers since the time of their inception. While 
each of these transactions has been discrete, there is evidence of recurrent discrete 
transactions without any legally binding original agreement for repeat purchase. Instead 
there is an implicit (or at most orally expressed) promise for future orders that is subject 
to suppliers’ ability to maintain the expected level of performance within the current 
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exchange in terms of price and quality specifications, on-time delivery, social compliance 
and protection of intellectual property. In addition, suppliers are required to make a 
moderate degree of relationship-specific investment, such as the purchase of customised 
raw materials, the specialisation of the labour force, and/or the adoption of social codes 
of conduct, in order to be able to meet individual buyers’ expectations. This investment is 
necessary not only for the completion of the current transaction but also for the 
realisation of buyers’ promises to make repeat purchases. In this paper, we coin the 
expression ‘tacit promissory contracting’ to describe this specific form of relationship. 
Against this background, the present paper sets out to explore the following three 
research questions: (1) Can suppliers in such relationships access any of their buyers’ 
tacit knowledge? (2) What implications does their access or the lack thereof have for 
their economic upgrading? (3) What strategies do suppliers adopt to compensate for 
existing knowledge asymmetries? 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual background of 
the paper after which section 3 outlines the methodology. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the findings. The conclusion section summarises the theoretical and managerial 
implications, limitations and further research ideas. 
2 Conceptual background 
2.1 Tacit promissory contracting 
The relational form explored in this paper can be explained by drawing upon the theory 
of the governance of contractual relations (Williamson, 1985). Macneil (2000) defines 
contracts as ‘relations among people who have exchanged, or expect to be exchanging in 
the future – in other words exchange relations’. ‘In this very idea, contract refers to the 
“relationship” in which the exchange occurs rather than specific transactions, specific 
agreement, specific promises or specific exchanges’ (Macneil, 2000, p.878). Therefore, a 
contract can be informal or formal/legally binding. However, in the legal landscape, a 
contract is always legally binding; and according to the law of contracts a legally binding 
contract includes the agreement of both parties in a form which is sufficiently certain for 
the court to enforce (McKendrick, 2015). Contract law identifies two main forms of 
legally binding contracts: classical and relational. While classical contracts are rigid in 
nature and are used for governing discrete arm’s-length transactions, relational contracts 
refer to original legally binding agreements which include flexible clauses and which are 
applied for the governing of ongoing transactions between firms and also other 
administrative-type, tacit exchanges that may or may not refer to the original agreement.  
In the theory of governance of contractual relations, Williamson (1985) theorised 
about two extreme forms of governance, market and relational, drawing upon the 
classical and relational contracting laws respectively. Market governance is efficacious 
when a one-off discrete transaction is made with little/no transaction-specific investment 
made by either party because the goods in question are standardised in nature and could 
be produced with standard equipment. Such transactions are operationalised through a 
classical sales contract and there exists no joint planning on future structures and 
processes for maintaining the relationship. On the contrary, relational governance is 
applied when parties make recurrent discrete transactions under an original legally  
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binding agreement, even if not all of the interactions, investments and exchanges will 
always refer to the original agreement. Such relationships are characterised by a high 
degree of reciprocity in terms of relationship-specific investment, socio-economic 
support, planning for the future and problem solving. The exchanges in such 
relationships involve a high level of tacit content and cannot always be measured in 
monetary value. The termination of the relationship is highly unlikely and, if it does 
occur, is likely to be gradual (Williamson, 1985).  
The form of relationship studied in this paper sits in the middle of a spectrum with an 
extreme transactional pole and an extreme relational pole. The studied firms have been 
making recurrent discrete transactions with the same buyers since their inception, but 
without the existence of any original legally binding written agreement. Each transaction 
is discrete and undergoes a process of bargaining in which the buyers often dominate and 
the suppliers consent to the price through an invoice. The international nature of the 
transaction could potentially result in greater uncertainty for both parties in terms  
of currency rate fluctuation, and payment and shipment delays, which necessitates  
the involvement of a third party as a guarantor. Thus, each time, the exchange is 
operationalised through a letter of consent (LC), issued jointly by the banks of the 
supplier and the buyer, providing a guarantee of payment and the delivery of the goods 
respectively. The LC is the only legally binding document that holds the substance of 
each exchange, such as the agreed price, volume, quality specifications and other clauses 
of sale. Buyers are not legally bound to make a repeat purchase, although they make a 
promise (non-legally binding) in which they informally (primarily orally) consent to 
make a repeat purchase if the suppliers perform at an expected level in the current 
transaction. Suppliers still have to make relationship-specific investments, such as the 
purchase of customised raw materials, the specialisation of labour and the 
implementation of labour codes in order for the current transaction to happen and to 
attract repeat orders from the same buyer, even though the plans for future orders are 
never legally binding and always tentative. 
The buyer’s ‘promise’ is the key incentive that encourages suppliers to make 
idiosyncratic investments. According to contract law, the definition of a ‘contract 
promise’ corresponds to a ‘present communication of a commitment to future 
engagement in a specified measured exchange’ (Macneil, 1978, p.858). In this case, the 
‘specified measured exchange’ is suppliers’ past performance and their commitment  
to serve the buyers’ customised needs (expressed via their relationship-specific 
investments). Macneil (1978, p.858) also stresses that ‘trust must exist if a promise is to 
be of any value’. Therefore, suppliers make such investments primarily out of their trust 
in the buyers and their tacit expectation of receiving future orders from them, although 
there is no legally binding agreement. As the relationship is primarily based on an 
informal, either orally expressed or implicit, promise, the term ‘tacit promissory 
contracting’ can be coined to describe it. A comparison of tacit promissory contracting 
with market and relational governance is displayed in Table 1, including dimensions  
such as level of personal involvement, communication, measurability, socio-economic 
support, planning, cooperation, sharing of obligations, transferability, duration, 
commencement, termination and participants’ views (cf. Macneil, 1978), to contrast the 
features of extreme transactional and relational forms of governance.  
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Table 1 Promissory contracting: a comparison with market governance and relational 
governance 
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Table 1 Promissory contracting: a comparison with market governance and relational 
governance (continued) 
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With rising global competition and the ever-increasing power of reputable branded 
retailers, numerous suppliers compete to be part of the GVCs of these retailers. There 
exists an extreme power asymmetry between MNEs and their suppliers (Pietrobelli and 
Saliola, 2008; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005). This explains why MNEs can control operations 
through an informal promise of a repeat purchase without any legal obligation to deliver 
on that promise. At the same time, the hope that the buyer will place a repeat purchase 
and a lack of alternatives obliges suppliers to follow MNEs’ codified instructions, 
maintain performance-oriented expectations and make relationship-specific investments. 
The absence of a legal agreement enhances the flexibility and bargaining power for the 
MNE buyers, making termination fairly easy and rapid, without incurring much of a 
transaction cost (Williamson, 2008). The higher degree of flexibility could also bring in 
increased economic efficiency for the MNEs (cf. Madhok and Tallman, 1998). On the 
contrary, this higher degree of flexibility translates into greater uncertainty for the 
suppliers. As a consequence, suppliers are likely to be more committed to offer 
reciprocity in exchange for MNEs’ promises by maintaining expected levels of 
performance and relationship-specific investments. Therefore, the footloose nature of  
the relationship enables the buyers to capture greater economic efficiency from their 
suppliers. 
2.2 Knowledge transfer in international outsourcing relationships 
The IB literature on knowledge transfer predominantly focuses on knowledge flows 
between MNE headquarters and their subsidiaries (Bjorkman et al., 2004; Lyles and Salk, 
2007). The knowledge-transfer process has been studied in the context of international 
joint ventures (Lyles and Salk, 2007; Park, 2011) and acquisitions (Bresman et al., 1999; 
Bresman et al., 2009; Zou and Ghauri, 2008). Previous studies have identified the  
role of MNEs’ capabilities (Park, 2011), willingness (Wang et al., 2004) and control 
mechanisms (Park and Choi, 2014) as factors shaping the success of knowledge transfer 
to subsidiaries. The attention of these studies is on MNEs as the focal node of knowledge 
creation and distribution to their subsidiaries (Marchi et al., 2014). This body of literature 
presumes the knowledge flow to be a one-way process in which subsidiaries are regarded 
as mere learners (Lyles and Salk, 2007).  
An alternative stream of IB literature highlights the role of subsidiaries in knowledge 
creation (Almeida and Phene, 2004; Andersson et al., 2005), their contribution in 
extracting local knowledge and then feeding it into MNEs’ global networks (Buckley and 
Carter, 2002; Mudambi, 2002). These studies shift the focus towards subsidiaries from 
the traditional one on headquarters as the focal nodes of knowledge. Even so, these 
studies are centred on knowledge flows within an intra-organisational network, in which 
greater coordination and collaboration exist between a knowledge transferor and recipient 
(Marchi et al., 2014).  
Only recently, a small number of studies have examined knowledge transfer in inter-
firm networks such as international strategic alliances (Ho and Wang, 2015) and cross-
border outsourcing relationships (Liu and Zhang, 2014). The tendency for regarding 
MNEs as the vital source of knowledge is also evident in this body of literature (Bojica 
and Fuentes, 2012; Liu, 2012). Suppliers are assumed to depend only on MNE buyers for 
knowledge resources (Liu, 2012). Further to this, Liu and Zhang (2014) found that the 
knowledge flow from MNE buyers influenced suppliers’ capability formation. While this  
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body of literature provides critical insights on knowledge transfer within inter-firm 
networks, it ignores the alternative sources of knowledge (besides MNE buyers) that may 
influence suppliers’ upgrading performance.  
In this respect, Fletcher and Harris (2012) argue that small firms can acquire tacit and 
explicit knowledge required for internationalisation from both external and internal 
sources. They list a number of internal and external knowledge sources. The internal 
sources include employees and MNE buyers, and the external sources include network 
partners, business associations, chambers of commerce, consultancy firms or research 
agencies, trade databases and government sources. Tacit knowledge can be acquired 
and/or developed from past mistakes, collaboration with buyers/partners, grafting and 
mimicking competitors. Explicit knowledge can originate from internal staff, formal and 
informal communication lines, codified information from buyers and published 
organisational documents (Huber, 1991).  
The alternative sources (other than buyers), including employees, network partners, 
business associations and consultancy firms, may hold specific significance in our paper. 
We assume that suppliers’ access to MNE buyers’ knowledge resources will be limited in 
our relational context. Li et al. (2010) argue that a formal legally binding written contract 
can enhance the potential for explicit and tacit knowledge flow in a long-term 
relationship in three ways; first, by constructing the foundation of collaborative exchange 
though formalisation of precise goals and expectations; second, by reducing the risk and 
thereby increasing the level of comfort to an collaborative exchange through prevention 
of opportunistic behaviour; and third, by formalising the process of knowledge transfer. 
In line with these arguments, a possible question could, therefore, be whether and how 
the absence of a formal contract influences suppliers’ access to MNE buyers’ knowledge 
resources.  
In addition, the access may also depend on MNEs’ strategic intent to share 
knowledge with the suppliers (conceptualised as ‘knowledge openness’ in Liu and Zhang 
(2014)). In this respect, we draw on Giuliani and Macchi (2014) who suggest that, when 
MNEs’ strategic motivation for investment is to seek economic efficiency, they have an 
insignificant/negative economic impact on host-country firms. This implies that 
efficiency-seeking MNEs are likely to safeguard their core knowledge (often design 
skills and branding) and thus reduce knowledge transfer or unintended spill-overs to a 
minimum level. These MNEs may allow suppliers to access only the codified knowledge 
that they need in order to smoothly perform the production function. Hence, the suppliers 
in our study context are unlikely to get access to their MNE buyers’ tacit knowledge; if 
this is the case, then how do the suppliers compensate for the lack of knowledge resulting 
from their constrained access? In this respect, Sinkovics et al. (2014) argue that firm 
survival is often dependent on alleviating constraints. In line with this argument, 
suppliers’ survival in the global market and their ability to satisfy powerful trading 
partners may depend on their strategies to alleviate the knowledge constraints which is an 
area of research that has received limited attention to date (Marchi et al., 2014). 
2.3 GVC governance, upgrading and knowledge dynamics 
GVC analysis could argued to be a framework for investigating the management of 
externalisation in a global context. More specifically, the framework helps us to 
understand how a group of firms operating in a specific functional position is governed 
by a lead firm (Gereffi and Lee, 2012). The primary focus of GVC analysis is on the 
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governance of inter-firm relations and thus it offers a basis for IB studies aiming to 
investigate knowledge flow and other concerns in networked forms of MNE-supplier 
relationships (Lee and Gereffi, 2015). The GVC approach provides a holistic view of 
global industries from two vintage points: top down and bottom up (Gereffi and Lee, 
2012). The top-down view focuses on the organisation of value chain activities and the 
modes of governance coordinating the value chain (Gereffi et al., 2005), while the 
bottom-up view focuses on upgrading by suppliers (Barrientos et al., 2011; Gereffi, 1999; 
Giuliani et al., 2005; Pavlínek and Ženka, 2011). These two perspectives are 
complementary and interdependent (Lee and Gereffi, 2015). 
Within the top-down view, Gereffi et al. (2005) identify five possible modes of 
governance. Market governance and hierarchical governance are the opposite extremes 
with the first one referring to purely transactional, non-equity relationship and the later 
one referring to equity relationship characterised by high degree of collaborative 
exchange. Between these two extremes, the three non-equity forms of relationships are 
captive, relational and modular. Our studied form of relationship is very much in line 
with the captive form of governance, in which buyers restrict the supplier from serving 
other buyers in order to exclude competitors from reaping the benefits of their efforts. 
However, one of the key differences in the case of ‘tacit promissory contracting’ is that 
suppliers are not bound to serve a specific buyer and can serve multiple buyers at the 
same time. The other characteristics of captivity are still prevalent, such as the high 
bargaining power of the buyers, a high ability to codify, low supplier capabilities and an 
absence of mutuality.  
In contrast to Williamson’s (1985) theory of contractual governance, the ‘contract’ 
(formal or informal) is not a focus of the theory of GVC governance put forward by 
Gereffi et al. (2005). Thus, it is not yet sufficiently understood to what extent ‘tacit 
promissory contracting’ differs from the captive form of governance from a contractual 
point of view. This ambiguity highlights a specific concern about the theory of GVC 
governance in relation to the role of a legally binding contract within the different forms 
of governance. It is observed in our paper that the existence and the form of a legally 
binding contract can potentially shape the extent of uncertainty and power asymmetry 
involved in a buyer-supplier relationship, which can influence the nature of the 
governance as well. To this end, the form of contract could be an important factor in non-
equity-based governance modes, which, however, is not explicitly highlighted in the 
theory of GVC governance.  
The bottom-up view of GVC analysis focuses on upgrading, defined as the ‘capacity 
of a firm to innovate in order to increase the value added’ (Giuliani et al., 2005, p.550). 
Economic upgrading is a form of upgrading that has a capital dimension and a labour 
dimension. The capital dimension refers to the use of new machinery and advanced 
technology. The labour dimension refers to skills development through which increased 
productivity is achieved (Barrientos et al., 2011). Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) 
categorise economic upgrading in the following way: 
i Process upgrading involves changes in the production process with the objective of 
making it more efficient; this can be achieved by substituting capital for labour. 
ii Product upgrading means introducing more advanced product types, often requiring 
higher-skilled workers to make items with enhanced features. 
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iii Functional upgrading is changing the mix of activities performed towards higher-
value-added tasks. Gereffi and Frederick (2010) suggest four functional upgrading 
trajectories:  
a Cut, make and trim (CMT) producers: the focus of the supplier is on production 
alone, and assembling imported inputs following buyers’ specifications. 
b Package contractor sourcing or Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM): the 
supplier takes on a broader range of tangible manufacturing-related functions, 
such as sourcing inputs and inbound logistics in addition to production. 
c Full package provider or Original Design Manufacturer (ODM): supplier carries 
out some of the pre-production processes, including design and R&D. 
d Original Brand Manufacturer (OBM): supplier acquires post-production 
capabilities and is able to fully develop products under its own brand names.  
iv Chain upgrading means shifting to a more technologically advanced production 
chain that involves moving into new industries or product markets. 
In GVC analysis, knowledge dynamics are usually examined in relation to the process of 
upgrading. While IB studies predominantly focus on intra-organisational knowledge 
flows (mainly, between headquarters and subsidiary), the GVC literatures cover the same 
in a range of inter-firm/non-equity relational contexts (Marchi et al., 2014). The GVC 
analysis explores the link between these forms of inter-firm governance and the nature of 
knowledge transferred (e.g. Gereffi et al., 2005). There is also evidence in the GVC 
literature that the form of inter-firm governance influences the type of upgrading in the 
supply base (e.g. Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Furthermore, Ernst and Kim (2002) find 
that inter-firm knowledge transfer in a global production network provides new 
opportunities for capability formation by local suppliers in developing countries. 
Previous studies in GVC analysis, therefore, have separately examined the connection 
between inter-firm governance and the nature of knowledge flow (e.g. Gereffi et al., 
2005), inter-firm governance and the type of upgrading (e.g. Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002) and the nature of knowledge flows and suppliers’ capability development (e.g. 
Ernst and Kim, 2002). While these findings imply that there may exist a link between the 
form of inter-firm governance, the nature of knowledge flows and the level of suppliers’ 
upgrading (Marchi et al., 2014), to date this line of reasoning remains unaddressed in the 
GVC domain. Inspired by GVC analysis, therefore, we aim to explore this link.  
GVC analysis not only pays attention to MNEs as the focal node controlling 
knowledge flows, but also considers the role of suppliers. The capabilities of suppliers 
are regarded as a key determinant of knowledge flow and form of governance in this 
domain (Gereffi et al., 2005). It must be noted, however, that GVC analysis has also been 
criticised for its lack of focus on the firm-level internal strategy adopted for such 
capability development (Coe et al., 2008). As a consequence, there is limited attention 
accorded to suppliers’ strategies for acquiring knowledge outside of the relationship with 
their lead firm. In tacit promissory contracting, in which buyers may actively want to 
limit the transfer of knowledge, suppliers’ additional strategies for knowledge acquisition 
may matter even more for upgrading. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 The study context 
The study is based on data collected from three Bangladeshi garment manufacturing 
firms. The Bangladeshi garment industry has grown quickly since its inception during the 
1980s (Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), 2015). 
After China, it is the second most sought after production destination for Western 
retailers. The producers in the industry supply primarily to American and European 
retailers. Most suppliers produce low-to-medium-value-added basic garments. Notably, 
the value added by the industry has remained static at around 25–30% for the last  
20 years. Only a limited number of suppliers have moved beyond CMT to upgrade 
service levels such as quality lab (39%), design (36%), composite unit (21%) and 
ticketing (10%) (McKinsey, 2011). As a consequence, the Bangladeshi garment industry 
can be deemed an interesting context for studying upgrading. 
The studied firms have been supplying to most of their buyers for a long time. 
However, they also produce small orders from new buyers, most of which are seasonal 
and short-term. In line with the conceptualisation of promissory contracting presented 
earlier, these firms have been involved in discrete recurrent transactions with the same 
buyers for a long period of time without the existence of an original legal agreement 
binding the relationship. The absence of a legal contract leaves both parties with the 
flexibility to terminate the relationship at any point in time without giving formal notice 
and without any involvement from the court. All three firms had, however, received 
informal promises from their long-term buyers regarding repeat purchases and had 
subsequently made investments to maintain the ongoing relationships with the buyers, 
such as the training of their labour forces so as to be able to meet buyers’ specific quality 
requirements, the purchase of customised raw materials and compliance with their 
buyers’ labour codes. Thus, the form of these inter-firm relationships is in line with the 
characteristics of tacit promissory contracting. This unique relational context makes the 
cases interesting to study. 
3.2 Research design and sample 
The study is based on a multiple case study approach. The data have been collected 
through interviews with the owners/managers (six interviews). The interviews lasted for 
one and half hours and were followed by factory visits. Interviewees were asked about 
the history, critical incidents, current constraints and future plans of their firm. The 
interview guide also included questions about their relationships with their buyers (such 
as the existence of a contract, length of relationship, process of ordering, materialising 
and finishing a transaction, exchange of knowledge and information, modes of contacting 
buyers, critical shapers of repetitive relationships and so on). Interviews were conducted 
in Bengali and were translated and transcribed afterwards. Organisational documents 
such as annual reports, sample order placement documents and buyers’ design 
specifications were also collected.  
The selection criteria included the presence of the relational context explored in this 
paper, the size of the firms, and their resource constraints. The satisfaction of these 
criteria by the case companies enabled us to examine the knowledge flows between 
buyers and suppliers as well as suppliers’ strategies for acquiring necessary knowledge 
resources to compensate for knowledge asymmetries. 
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Table 2 Background of firms 
Topic/firm Firm A Firm B Firm C 
Starting year 2010 2009 2010 
Country location Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh 
Ownership structure 
Investment from 
Turkish and 
Bangladeshi owners 
(joint venture) 
Owned by two 
brothers (local) 
Owned by two 
friends (local) 
Surrounding 
environment Urban: rented building 
Industrial: own 
building in 
industrial area 
Industrial: rented 
shared building 
Number of 
employees 500 600 550 
Workforce nationality: 
Managers Bangladeshi and foreign Bangladeshi Bangladeshi 
Supervisors Bangladeshi Bangladeshi Bangladeshi 
Workers Bangladeshi Bangladeshi Bangladeshi 
No. of production 
lines Five lines Six lines Five lines 
Size Small Small Small 
Turnover £9 million £13 million £6 million 
Net profit £0.18 million £0.24 million No data 
Production method 
Traditional 
(progressive bundle 
system) 
Traditional 
(progressive bundle 
system) 
Traditional 
(progressive bundle 
system) 
Form of relationship 
with MNE buyer 
Non-equity, non-
contractual, captive 
Non-equity, non-
contractual, captive 
Non-equity, non-
contractual, captive 
Structure of local 
value chain 
Lead contractor with 
own network of 
suppliers in 
Bangladesh 
Lead contractor 
with own network 
of suppliers in 
Bangladesh 
Lead contractor with 
own network of 
suppliers in 
Bangladesh 
Origin of buyers 
Mainly the 
Netherlands; other 
European countries 
The Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Spain The UK and Italy 
Means of contact 
with buyer Direct 
Direct and buying 
house 
Direct and buying 
house 
Length of 
relationship  
with buyers 
Mixed (long-term and 
short-term) 
Mixed (long-term 
and short-term) 
Mixed (long-term 
and short-term) 
The selected firms share a number of similarities (Table 2). They were all established in 
2009 or 2010. They have 500–600 employees and five or six production lines. Their 
product ranges mainly include tops such as t-shirts and polo shirts. All of them supply 
European buyers. All the firms are OEM service providers (Table 3). Their position is 
that of lead contractor/first-tier supplier within the buyers’ GVC network. Each has its 
own network of local suppliers. They receive orders from buyers directly and then source 
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raw materials from their supplier network. The firms have some minor differences in 
terms of the surrounding area, ownership structure, workforce nationality, revenue 
turnover and net profit. 
Table 3 State of economic upgrading 
Topic/firm Firm A Firm B Firm C 
Capital: 
Type of upgrading 
Horizontal 
Capacity increase 
Productivity increase 
Horizontal 
Moving to self-
constructed building 
Capacity increase 
Productivity increase 
Horizontal 
Capacity increase 
Functional activities OEM  OEM OEM 
Level of automation 
Recently purchased 
automated machines to 
replace helpers 
Recently purchased 
automated machines 
to replace helpers 
Planning to 
purchase automated 
machines to replace 
helpers 
Technological 
advancement 
CAD and CAM 
machine appliqué and 
graphic printing 
machine 
CCTV camera on 
factory floor 
CAD and CAM 
machine 
CCTV camera on 
factory floor 
N/A 
Level of value-
added in product Medium value-added Low value-added Low value-added 
Labour: 
Productivity rate  38% (previously 33%) 35% (previously 28%) 30% 
Defect rate  7% (previously 8%) 7% (previously 12%) 8% 
Skill development 
mechanism  
Informal on-the-job 
training by colleagues 
and supervisors 
Self-learning 
Informal on-the-job 
training by colleagues 
and supervisors 
Self-learning 
Informal on-the-job 
training by 
colleagues and 
supervisors 
Self-learning 
Promotion Informal, skill-based Informal, skill-based Informal, skill-based 
Work allocation 
Daily production target 
given 
Overtime allowed up 
to 2 hours/day 
Daily production 
target given 
Overtime allowed up 
to 2 hours/day 
No targets given 
Overtime practised 
up to 4–6 hours/day 
Planning to 
introduce daily 
target system 
Job rotation allowed Not practised Not practised Not practised 
Workers’ skills Specialised and repetitive 
Specialised and 
repetitive 
Specialised and 
repetitive 
The state of economic upgrading of the firms was analysed by drawing upon Barrientos 
et al. (2011), who categorise economic upgrading in terms of capital and labour 
dimensions (Table 4). The capital dimension included factors such as functional  
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activities, technological advancement, level of automation and level of value added, 
while the labour dimension included the productivity rate, defect rate, skills development 
mechanism, promotion, work allocation system and workers’ level of skill. 
The data were analysed using template analysis. The dimensions in the template 
included the upgrading pursued, the relevant content of technological and marketing 
knowledge and their respective sources, and finally, the type of knowledge transferred 
from buyers. The template was an amalgamation of dimensions originating from 
different literatures and was developed with the purpose of exploring the link between 
the nature of upgrading and the content and sources of knowledge. The upgrading 
initiatives included in Table 4 were a summary of the findings from Table 3. The sources 
and content of technological and marketing knowledge were analysed using Fletcher and 
Harris (2012). 
Fletcher and Harris (2012) identified two types of knowledge as most relevant for 
firms involved in international business, i.e. technological and marketing knowledge. 
Both types contain tacit and explicit dimensions. The explicit elements of technological 
knowledge involve production output, codified specifications, raw materials, plant and 
machinery, while the tacit elements could be skills, process knowledge and organisation. 
The explicit element of marketing knowledge comprises information on the behaviours 
of suppliers, competitors and customers. Besides the information-oriented components, 
marketing knowledge also involves tacit knowledge of how to do pricing, product 
development, channel management, marketing communication, selling, planning and 
implementation. Drawing upon Huber (1991), Fletcher and Harris (2012) also presented 
a range of external (network partners, government sources, business associations and 
competitors) and internal (such as, formal and informal communication with buyers and 
employees, published organisational documents, experiences and mistakes) sources that 
can be used by export-oriented firms to acquire the tacit and explicit knowledge required 
for internationalisation. The use of Fletcher and Harris’s (2012) dimensions in the 
framework allowed us to examine the use of external and internal sources for acquiring 
both the technological and marketing knowledge required, and to find out how those 
sources influenced the nature of the upgrading achieved by the studied firms.  
The template analysis allowed us to analyse data using a pre-determined framework, 
which enabled us to compare the cases across these same dimensions, and to thereby 
discover the underlying drivers of upgrading in the firms with a relatively objective 
approach. The high degree of structure in the template analysis also facilitated the 
synthesis of concepts from two spheres of literature (i.e. IB and GVC) and the 
establishment of analytical links (King, 2012).  
4 Results and discussion 
The data revealed three key findings. First, the case firms only had access to buyers’ 
explicit/codified knowledge. This finding shows that suppliers lack access to the tacit 
knowledge resources of their MNE buyers, which answers the inquiry made in our first 
research question. Second, they had developed relevant technological and marketing 
capabilities that were necessary for upgrading. They had done so based on their own 
firm-level experiences of managing buyers’ repetitive purchases. They had also used a 
range of external sources to acquire knowledge, mostly publicly available information 
sources. As a result, the studied firms had only been able to pursue process upgrading 
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and only in technocratic and output-oriented dimensions rather than in labour/skill-
oriented ones (Table 4). The last two findings answer the research questions related to 
suppliers’ strategies for knowledge acquisition (RQ3) and the upgrading implications of 
those strategies (RQ2). 
All three firm owners indicated that they had received only codified design 
instructions and published quality and labour standards from the buyers. None of them 
had received technical assistance, training support, financial assistance or managerial 
guidance from the buyers. Thus they had learnt mainly to decode buyers’ codified 
instructions and implement them. They had learnt to satisfy specific buyers through 
repeated service delivery. The owner of Firm A said that local representatives of 
new/existing buyers often visited their factories and recommended technical changes 
(such as machinery or quality improvements). The implementation of those changes was 
necessary in order to enter into a new relationship or extend an existing one. Similarly, 
the owner of Firm B remarked,  
“We have dedicated production lines for our regular buyers. In those lines, we 
have machines set up according to their [individual buyers’] specifications. 
The workers working on those lines are specifically trained to meet individual 
buyers’ product and quality requirements. The supervisors train the line 
workers to concentrate on sensitive aspects for individual buyers; for instance, 
some buyers are sensitive about the accuracy of collars, some about the 
buttons or zippers, and some about the cuts  We had to learn to decode 
buyers’ instructions through our own efforts. Initially, we struggled, but after 
several years of experience we can now do this more confidently.”  
The firms were, therefore, expected to make idiosyncratic investments (Subramani and 
Venkatraman, 2003), even though they received no financial or technical assistance from 
the buyers. The absence of collaboration in the relationships limited the transfer of tacit 
or experiential knowledge to the suppliers (cf. Locke, 2013). The MNE buyers’ desire for 
economic efficiency had limited the extent of knowledge transfer and even spill-over to 
the suppliers (Giuliani and Macchi, 2014). As a consequence, the firms stated that they 
acquired tacit knowledge mainly from meeting individual buyers’ preferences, and from 
their own mistakes and problem-solving initiatives. These experiences were limited 
within the boundary of day-to-day activities, were relationship specific and were mostly 
technocratic.  
The suppliers’ lack of access to their buyers’ knowledge resources seemed to have 
had implications for their upgrading as well. Firms B and C had started out as CMT 
service providers and later become OEM suppliers. Firm A had started out as a buying 
house and, within a year, had established an OEM factory. The findings show the 
upgrading initiatives to have remained relatively slow in the early years for all three 
firms. The upgrading initiatives had accelerated somewhat over the last two years as they 
had experienced pressure for social compliance from the buyers. In order to make up for 
the increased cost of compliance, they had sought to increase productivity and sales. Firm 
A and B had replaced the majority of their manual machines with automatic machines in 
order to produce more output for a lower labour cost. Both firms had also purchased 
sophisticated machines such as computer-aided manufacturing (CAM) and computer-
aided design (CAD) machines for implementing complex designs. They had installed 
CCTV cameras on the factory floor to monitor workers’ negligence and theft and thus 
minimise productivity losses. Firm A had also introduced a new unit for appliqué and 
embroidery and had thus started producing more complex designs. Firm C was in the  
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process of implementing similar initiatives at the time of our data collection. All three 
firms had recently included new buyers to increase sales. As a consequence, they had 
introduced a daily target-based work allocation system to increase workers’ productivity. 
Under this system, workers were allocated daily pieces to be produced within regular 
factory hours (eight hours) and any additional time required would not be considered 
overtime and would thus be unpaid. Systematic production scheduling was being used to 
work out the daily targets. This system was allowing the firms to produce the same 
amount of output at a lower cost by avoiding overtime. While a number of initiatives had 
been implemented to upgrade machinery, none of the cases showed evidence of efforts 
taken to develop workers’ skills.  
The content and sources of technological and marketing knowledge had needed 
adjustment over the period studied, as the firms’ upgrading initiatives had changed. 
During their early years, the focus of developing technological knowledge had been on 
learning the overall apparel manufacturing process, handling the machinery and decoding 
buyers’ designs and material instructions. All three firms had experienced pressure from 
buyers to maintain economic and other performance-oriented dimensions. The firm 
owners said that efficiency in these aspects was a precursor to deepening the 
relationships with the buyers and was also vital for the survival of their businesses. The 
owner of Firm A remarked,  
“Commitment matters greatly in sustaining relationships with buyers. As the 
relationships with the buyers have deepened, we have become increasingly 
cautious about maintaining our commitment towards quality control, on-time 
delivery and copyright issues.”  
Therefore, a large amount of their required technological knowledge involved quality 
checks, systematic scheduling and intellectual property protection. In recent years, 
additional focus had been put on learning the mechanisms needed to increase labour 
productivity and on handling sophisticated machinery. Thus, all the firm owners 
highlighted the need for knowledge of machine automation, effective work allocation 
methods and workers’ incentive systems. 
The studied firms had adopted various strategies to fulfil their requirements for 
technological knowledge. They had used a number of internal sources for developing and 
leveraging technological know-how. For instance, Firms A and C had relied heavily on 
their owners’ previous experience in the industry. Firms A and B had recruited local and 
foreign experts such as industrial engineers, designers and managers to internalise tacit 
knowledge. Firm C, on the contrary, had sponsored their current production manager to 
attend courses on operations management and to learn about systematic scheduling 
techniques. All of the firms showed a preference for hiring experienced workers from the 
surrounding industrial areas to avoid the cost of training.  
In addition, all three firms had used external sources for acquiring technological 
know-how. One of the major sources had been the training and meetings provided and 
held by the BGMEA. They had received information on current industry practices and 
advanced process-oriented methods from BGMEA programs. Firm B had hired technical 
consultants during the construction and setting up of its new factory building. Following 
competitors’ moves (such as the purchase of new machinery, the recruitment of experts) 
had been a key strategy for gathering information on technological trends in the industry 
and was observed mainly in the case of Firms A and C. 
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Table 4 Suppliers’ strategies for knowledge acquisition 
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Table 4 Suppliers’ strategies for knowledge acquisition (continued) 
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Table 5 Strategies for knowledge acquisition and upgrading: Firm A 
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ew
 w
or
k 
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
ba
se
d 
on
 d
ai
ly
 ta
rg
et
s t
o 
in
cr
ea
se
 
w
or
ke
rs
’ p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 w
hi
le
 
re
du
ci
ng
 o
ve
rti
m
e 
N
ew
 te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ac
qu
ire
d 
 
G
ar
m
en
t p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s 
 K
no
w
le
dg
e 
of
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 
 I
m
pl
em
en
tin
g 
co
m
pl
ex
 d
es
ig
ns
 
w
ith
 so
ph
is
tic
at
ed
 c
ut
s a
nd
 
pa
tte
rn
s  
 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
of
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
ne
w
 
m
ac
hi
ne
s 
 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
of
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 to
 
in
cr
ea
se
 w
or
ke
rs
’ p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
So
ur
ce
 o
f n
ew
 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l k
no
w
le
dg
e 
 
Pr
ev
io
us
 w
or
k 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
of
 p
ar
tn
er
 
 P
re
vi
ou
s w
or
k 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
 T
he
 T
ur
ki
sh
 in
ve
st
or
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
te
ch
ni
ca
l a
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
an
d 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l a
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
 T
ra
in
in
g 
fr
om
 B
G
M
EA
 fo
r 
m
ac
hi
ne
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
an
d 
qu
al
ity
 
co
nt
ro
l 
 R
ec
ru
itm
en
t o
f e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 
w
or
ke
rs
 fr
om
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s’
 
fa
ct
or
ie
s 
 
Su
pp
lie
rs
 o
f a
ut
o-
m
ac
hi
ne
 
de
m
on
st
ra
te
d 
to
 su
pe
rv
is
or
s  
 
R
ec
ru
its
 o
ne
 in
du
st
ria
l e
ng
in
ee
r 
to
 tr
ai
n 
w
or
ke
rs
 o
n 
em
br
oi
de
ry
 
m
ac
hi
ne
s 
 
R
ec
ru
its
 o
ne
 d
es
ig
ne
r t
o 
in
te
rp
re
t c
om
pl
ex
 d
es
ig
ns
 a
nd
 
us
e 
C
A
D
  
 
R
ec
ru
its
 a
 fe
w
 fo
re
ig
n 
em
pl
oy
ee
s (
fr
om
 T
ur
ke
y 
an
d 
th
e 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s)
 fo
r m
an
ag
er
ia
l 
ex
pe
rti
se
 
 
O
bs
er
ve
s h
ow
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s w
er
e 
in
tro
du
ci
ng
 n
ew
 sy
st
em
s t
o 
in
cr
ea
se
 w
or
ke
rs
’ p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
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Table 5 Strategies for knowledge acquisition and upgrading: Firm A (continued) 
 
To
pi
c/
ye
ar
 
20
10
 
20
11
–2
01
2 
20
13
 
Ea
rl
y 
20
14
 
N
ew
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ac
qu
ire
d 
 
B
uy
er
s’
 a
nd
 su
bc
on
tra
ct
or
s’
 
co
nt
ac
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 li
ai
so
n 
w
ith
 
bu
ye
rs
 
 
C
oo
rd
in
at
in
g 
lo
ca
l 
su
bc
on
tra
ct
or
s 
 B
uy
er
s’
 c
on
ta
ct
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 ra
w
 
m
at
er
ia
l a
nd
 m
ac
hi
ne
 su
pp
lie
rs
 
 A
pp
ro
ac
hi
ng
 b
uy
er
s a
t r
ig
ht
 ti
m
e 
to
 g
et
 se
as
on
al
 o
rd
er
s 
 C
oo
rd
in
at
in
g 
ra
w
 m
at
er
ia
l 
su
pp
lie
rs
 
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 n
ee
ds
 o
f 
ne
w
ly
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
bu
ye
rs
 
 
Pr
om
ot
in
g 
th
e 
ne
w
 u
pg
ra
de
d 
m
ac
hi
ne
s a
nd
 c
ap
ac
ity
 in
cr
ea
se
 
to
 b
uy
er
s t
hr
ou
gh
 w
eb
si
te
 a
nd
 
br
oc
hu
re
 
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s’
 
up
gr
ad
in
g 
in
iti
at
iv
es
 
So
ur
ce
 o
f n
ew
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
 
Pr
ev
io
us
 w
or
k 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
 
 
W
eb
 so
ur
ce
s 
 E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
fr
om
 b
uy
in
g 
ho
us
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
s f
ro
m
 p
re
vi
ou
s b
uy
er
s 
he
lp
 fi
rm
 to
 c
on
ta
ct
 n
ew
 o
ne
s 
 
A
tte
nd
s B
G
M
EA
 m
ee
tin
gs
 
 
Pe
rs
on
al
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
 o
th
er
 
ga
rm
en
t o
w
ne
rs
 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
tra
ns
fe
rr
ed
 
fr
om
 b
uy
er
s f
or
 
up
gr
ad
in
g 
 
C
od
ifi
ed
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
m
at
er
ia
l i
ns
tru
ct
io
ns
; 
qu
al
ity
 st
an
da
rd
s;
 la
bo
ur
 
st
an
da
rd
s 
 S
am
e 
 
Sa
m
e 
 
Sa
m
e 
R
ea
so
n 
fo
r u
pg
ra
di
ng
 
 
St
ar
t o
f b
us
in
es
s 
 T
o 
m
ee
t b
uy
er
s’
 d
em
an
d 
fo
r 
m
ed
iu
m
-v
al
ue
-a
dd
ed
 g
ar
m
en
ts
 
 
To
 c
om
pe
ns
at
e 
fo
r t
he
 c
os
t o
f 
C
SR
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
by
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 a
nd
 e
ff
ic
ie
nc
y 
 
To
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
pr
of
its
 b
y 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 a
nd
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 w
hi
le
 
be
in
g 
co
m
pl
ia
nt
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Table 6 Strategies for knowledge acquisition and upgrading: Firm B 
 
To
pi
c/
ye
ar
 
20
09
 
20
10
–2
01
2 
20
13
 
Ea
rl
y 
20
14
 
U
pg
ra
di
ng
 p
ur
su
ed
 
 
St
ar
t o
f f
ac
to
ry
 in
 o
ne
 
flo
or
 o
f a
 re
nt
ed
 sh
ar
ed
 
bu
ild
in
g 
w
ith
 tw
o 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
lin
es
 
 
Pr
ov
id
es
 C
M
T 
se
rv
ic
e 
 
In
cl
us
io
n 
of
 n
ew
 
bu
ye
rs
 
 
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
an
d 
st
ar
t o
f 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
in
 n
ew
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
fa
ct
or
y 
bu
ild
in
g 
w
ith
 si
x 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
lin
es
 
 
N
ew
 fa
ct
or
y 
be
co
m
es
 O
EM
 
se
rv
ic
e 
pr
ov
id
er
 
 
St
ar
ts
 c
on
ta
ct
in
g 
bu
ye
rs
 d
ire
ct
ly
 
 
Th
e 
ol
d 
fa
ct
or
y 
pr
ov
id
es
 C
M
T 
se
rv
ic
e 
fo
r C
hi
ne
se
 a
nd
 
M
al
ay
si
an
 b
uy
er
s 
 
R
ep
la
ce
s m
an
ua
l m
ac
hi
ne
s w
ith
 a
ut
o-
m
ac
hi
ne
s i
n 
ne
w
 fa
ct
or
y 
 
Pu
rc
ha
se
s C
A
D
 m
ac
hi
ne
s 
 
In
st
al
ls
 C
CT
V
  
 
In
tro
du
ce
s d
ai
ly
 ta
rg
et
-b
as
ed
 w
or
k 
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
 
W
or
ke
rs
’ p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 in
cr
ea
se
s f
ro
m
 2
8%
 to
 
35
%
 in
 n
ew
 fa
ct
or
y 
 
D
ef
ec
t r
at
e 
re
du
ce
d 
fr
om
 1
2%
 to
 8
%
 in
 n
ew
 
fa
ct
or
y 
 
N
o 
ch
an
ge
 in
 o
ld
 fa
ct
or
y 
R
el
ev
an
t t
ec
hn
ol
og
ic
al
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ac
qu
ire
d 
 
G
ar
m
en
t p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s 
 
Fa
ct
or
y 
se
t u
p 
 
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 w
or
ke
rs
 
 
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 w
or
ke
rs
 
 
D
ec
od
in
g 
bu
ye
rs
’ 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 
 
Q
ua
lit
y 
co
nt
ro
l, 
re
du
ci
ng
 le
ad
 
tim
e,
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
sc
he
du
lin
g 
 
O
pe
ra
tio
n 
of
 n
ew
 m
ac
hi
ne
s 
 
Ea
rly
 d
ef
ec
t d
et
ec
tio
n 
to
 re
du
ce
 w
as
ta
ge
 
 
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 w
or
ke
rs
’ p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
  
So
ur
ce
 o
f 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
 
M
ac
hi
ne
 su
pp
lie
rs
 g
iv
e 
tra
in
in
g 
on
 m
ac
hi
ne
s’
 
op
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
fa
ct
or
y 
se
t 
up
 
 
G
ui
da
nc
e 
fr
om
 b
uy
in
g 
ho
us
e 
 
R
ec
ru
itm
en
t o
f 
ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 
w
or
ke
rs
/e
xe
cu
tiv
es
 fr
om
 
th
e 
in
du
st
ria
l z
on
e 
 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 
su
pe
rv
is
or
s t
ra
in
 o
th
er
 
w
or
ke
rs
 
 
C
on
tin
uo
us
 c
on
ta
ct
 
w
ith
 b
uy
in
g 
ho
us
e 
to
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 b
uy
er
s’
 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 o
n 
de
si
gn
 
an
d 
qu
al
ity
 
 
Ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
fr
om
 p
re
vi
ou
s f
ac
to
ry
 
 
O
w
ne
rs
 a
tte
nd
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
by
 B
G
M
EA
 o
n 
qu
al
ity
 c
on
tro
l 
an
d 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
sc
he
du
lin
g 
 
H
ire
 c
on
su
lta
nt
 fo
r g
ui
da
nc
e 
on
 
bu
ild
in
g 
a 
co
m
pl
ia
nt
 fa
ct
or
y 
 
Le
ar
ni
ng
 fr
om
 b
en
ch
m
ar
k 
pr
ac
tic
es
 a
nd
 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
m
pe
tit
or
s 
 
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 fr
om
 B
G
M
EA
 
 
R
ec
ru
itm
en
t o
f i
nd
us
tri
al
 e
ng
in
ee
r t
o 
ha
nd
le
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
sc
he
du
le
s a
nd
 re
du
ce
 d
ef
ec
t r
at
e 
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Table 6 Strategies for knowledge acquisition and upgrading: Firm B (continued) 
 
To
pi
c/
ye
ar
 
20
09
 
20
10
–2
01
2 
20
13
 
Ea
rl
y 
20
14
 
R
el
ev
an
t m
ar
ke
tin
g 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ac
qu
ire
d 
 
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 b
uy
er
s 
ne
ed
s 
 
Sa
m
e 
 
N
ew
 b
uy
er
s’
 c
on
ta
ct
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
di
re
ct
ly
 
 
Pr
om
ot
in
g 
th
e 
ne
w
 c
om
pl
ia
nt
 
fa
ct
or
y 
to
 th
e 
bu
ye
rs
 
 
D
ev
el
op
in
g 
lin
ka
ge
s w
ith
 o
w
n 
lo
ca
l s
up
pl
ie
rs
 a
nd
 c
oo
rd
in
at
in
g 
th
em
 
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 n
ew
 b
uy
er
s w
ho
 w
an
t t
o 
so
ur
ce
 fr
om
 c
om
pl
ia
nt
 fa
ct
or
ie
s 
 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s’
 u
pg
ra
di
ng
 
in
iti
at
iv
es
 
So
ur
ce
 o
f m
ar
ke
tin
g 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
 
B
uy
in
g 
ho
us
es
  
 
B
uy
in
g 
ho
us
e 
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
s f
ro
m
 e
xi
st
in
g 
an
d 
ex
-
bu
ye
rs
 a
llo
w
 fi
rm
 to
 li
nk
 w
ith
 
ne
w
 b
uy
er
s 
 
O
w
ne
rs
’ o
ve
rs
ea
s v
is
its
 to
 se
ar
ch
 
fo
r b
uy
er
s 
 
A
tte
nd
in
g 
B
G
M
EA
 m
ee
tin
gs
/s
em
in
ar
s 
 
Es
ta
bl
is
he
s s
ep
ar
at
e 
pr
oc
ur
em
en
t a
nd
 
se
pa
ra
te
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
de
pa
rtm
en
t  
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
tra
ns
fe
rr
ed
 
fr
om
 b
uy
er
s f
or
 
up
gr
ad
in
g 
 
C
od
ifi
ed
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
m
at
er
ia
l i
ns
tru
ct
io
ns
; 
qu
al
ity
 st
an
da
rd
s;
 la
bo
ur
 
st
an
da
rd
s 
 
Sa
m
e 
 
Sa
m
e 
 
Sa
m
e 
R
ea
so
n 
fo
r u
pg
ra
di
ng
 
 
St
ar
t o
f b
us
in
es
s  
 
To
 in
cr
ea
se
 sa
le
s 
 
To
 m
ee
t C
SR
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t  
 
To
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
pr
of
its
 b
y 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 c
ap
ac
ity
 
an
d 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
w
hi
le
 b
ei
ng
 c
om
pl
ia
nt
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Table 7 Strategies for knowledge acquisition and upgrading: Firm C 
 
To
pi
c/
ye
ar
 
20
10
 
20
11
–2
01
2 
20
13
 
Ea
rly
 2
01
4 
U
pg
ra
di
ng
 p
ur
su
ed
 
 
St
ar
ts
 fa
ct
or
y 
w
ith
 th
re
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
lin
es
 a
s O
EM
 
se
rv
ic
e 
pr
ov
id
er
 
 
A
pp
ro
ac
he
s b
uy
er
s t
hr
ou
gh
 
ex
te
rn
al
 b
uy
in
g 
ho
us
es
 
 
St
ar
ts
 to
 c
on
ta
ct
 b
uy
er
s 
di
re
ct
ly
 in
 a
dd
iti
on
 to
 th
e 
on
es
 it
 is
 li
nk
ed
 to
 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
bu
yi
ng
 h
ou
se
  
 R
en
ts
 o
ne
 m
or
e 
flo
or
 to
 
in
cr
ea
se
 c
ap
ac
ity
 a
nd
 a
dd
s 
tw
o 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
lin
es
 
 A
dd
s m
or
e 
or
de
rs
 fr
om
 
ex
is
tin
g 
bu
ye
rs
 
 P
la
nn
in
g 
to
 re
pl
ac
e 
m
an
ua
l m
ac
hi
ne
s w
ith
 
au
to
-m
ac
hi
ne
 
 A
dd
s n
ew
 b
uy
er
s 
 P
la
nn
in
g 
to
 in
tro
du
ce
 d
ai
ly
 ta
rg
et
-b
as
ed
 
w
or
k 
al
lo
ca
tio
n 
R
el
ev
an
t t
ec
hn
ol
og
ic
al
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ac
qu
ire
d 
 
G
ar
m
en
t p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s 
 
Q
ua
lit
y 
co
nt
ro
l, 
re
du
ci
ng
 
le
ad
 ti
m
e 
 P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
sc
he
du
lin
g 
 T
ec
hn
iq
ue
s f
or
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 w
or
ke
rs
’ 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
 O
pe
ra
tin
g 
au
to
-m
ac
hi
ne
s  
So
ur
ce
 o
f 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
 
O
w
ne
r’
s p
re
vi
ou
s 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
in
 th
e 
in
du
st
ry
 
 
B
uy
er
’s
 p
ub
lis
he
d 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
  
 
C
om
pe
tit
or
s i
n 
th
e 
in
du
st
ria
l z
on
e 
 P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
m
an
ag
er
 
at
te
nd
in
g 
co
ur
se
 o
n 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 M
an
ag
em
en
t a
t 
un
iv
er
si
ty
 
 F
ol
lo
w
s c
om
pe
tit
or
s’
 c
ur
re
nt
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 to
 
in
cr
ea
se
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
R
el
ev
an
t m
ar
ke
tin
g 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
 
C
on
ta
ct
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fo
r r
aw
 
m
at
er
ia
l s
up
pl
ie
rs
 a
nd
 
bu
yi
ng
 h
ou
se
s 
 
C
oo
rd
in
at
in
g 
ra
w
 m
at
er
ia
l 
su
pp
lie
rs
 a
nd
 m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 
lia
is
on
 w
ith
 b
uy
er
s v
ia
 
bu
yi
ng
 h
ou
se
  
 
C
on
ta
ct
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fo
r 
ne
w
 b
uy
er
s t
o 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 
di
re
ct
ly
 
 N
/A
 
 C
on
ta
ct
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fo
r n
ew
 b
uy
er
s t
o 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 d
ire
ct
ly
 
So
ur
ce
 o
f m
ar
ke
tin
g 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
 
B
uy
in
g 
ho
us
e 
 
C
om
pe
tit
or
s i
n 
th
e 
in
du
st
ria
l z
on
e 
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
s f
ro
m
 
ex
is
tin
g/
ex
-b
uy
er
s h
el
pe
d 
fir
m
 to
 g
et
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 
ne
w
 b
uy
er
s 
 
Ita
lia
n 
pa
rtn
er
’s
 p
er
so
na
l 
ne
tw
or
k 
lin
ke
d 
th
e 
fir
m
 to
 
a 
fe
w
 n
ew
 b
uy
er
 c
on
ta
ct
s 
 N
/A
 
 O
w
ne
r’
s v
is
its
 to
 It
al
y 
an
d 
ot
he
r E
ur
op
ea
n 
co
un
tri
es
 to
 se
ar
ch
 fo
r n
ew
 b
uy
er
s 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
tra
ns
fe
rr
ed
 
fr
om
 b
uy
er
s f
or
 
up
gr
ad
in
g 
 
C
od
ifi
ed
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
m
at
er
ia
l i
ns
tru
ct
io
ns
; 
qu
al
ity
 st
an
da
rd
s;
 la
bo
ur
 
st
an
da
rd
s 
 
Sa
m
e 
 S
am
e 
 S
am
e 
R
ea
so
n 
fo
r u
pg
ra
di
ng
 
 
St
ar
t o
f b
us
in
es
s 
 
To
 re
du
ce
 re
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All three firms had gathered tacit marketing knowledge such as understanding buyers’ 
product-related preferences and their ways of working. The firm owners indicated  
that they had mainly developed such knowledge through experience during repeat 
transactions with specific buyers. The mistakes and problem-solving experiences over the 
course of a relationship had aided the development of such know-how. They had also 
needed to collect information on buyers’ contact details and to perform other liaison 
activities such as presenting to and negotiating with the buyers. All three firm owners 
said that their social networks, personal overseas visits and existing buyers’ references 
were the major sources of contacting new buyers. The other means of acquiring buyers’ 
information mentioned were searching web sources and attending meetings of the 
BGMEA. All three firms had recently undergone major changes in terms of social 
compliance. Thus, their new focus was to promote their differentiated position effectively 
to existing and prospective buyers. Gathering information on competitors’ upgrading 
moves was also critical for all the firms. Firms A and B had established a separate 
marketing division to manage such activities, while in Firm C they were mostly 
performed by the owner. 
The studied firms were using a number of the external and internal sources from the 
list of Fletcher and Harris (2012). The suppliers used these additional sources to 
compensate for their lack of access to buyers’ tacit knowledge. The findings further show 
that collaborative relationships and access to buyers’ knowledge resources are still 
critical for suppliers wishing to pursue a higher degree of upgrading (cf. Locke, 2013). 
Although, over a period of time, they had learned to better satisfy specific buyer needs, 
new skills were rarely learned. Also, with their limited resources, the suppliers could 
only access information-oriented or publicly available explicit knowledge, which only 
enabled them to improve technocratic or output-oriented dimensions of process 
upgrading. Such knowledge did not allow them to ‘deepen’ their upgrading initiatives 
(such as through workers’ skills development), let alone ‘climb the ladder’ (such as by 
becoming an ODM or OBM service provider) (Morrison et al., 2008). 
5 Conclusion 
This paper is written in the context of a special form of international outsourcing 
relationship described as ‘tacit promissory contracting’. Within this relational context, 
the case firms only had access to buyers’ explicit knowledge that they needed to 
smoothly perform the production function, such as codified design instructions and 
published quality and labour standards. The high level of uncertainty involved in the 
relationship had discouraged the buyers to share their core knowledge (such as design 
skills and branding) and thus reduce unintended spill-overs to a minimum level. The 
suppliers used additional sources to compensate for their lack of access to buyers’  
tacit knowledge. They had used a range of external sources to acquire knowledge, such 
as, attending training by trade associations, hiring external consultants, recruiting 
experienced workers and following competitors. Nevertheless, with their limited 
resources, the suppliers could access only information-oriented or publicly available 
explicit knowledge, which enabled them to improve only technocratic or output-oriented 
dimensions of process upgrading rather than in labour/skill-oriented ones. These findings 
answering the three research questions of the paper could have further conceptual and 
practical implications as discussed below. 
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5.1 Conceptual implications 
This paper contributes to the understanding of suppliers’ knowledge acquisition 
strategies in a labour-intensive low-tech industry. In the IB literature, MNEs are mostly 
assumed to be the focal node of knowledge transfer. However, in labour-intensive low-
tech industries there is no incentive for MNEs to transfer tacit knowledge to their 
suppliers as this is not essential for the delivery of the desired outputs. For this reason, 
our study focuses on suppliers’ unilateral strategies to compensate for existing 
knowledge asymmetries in their relationships with buyers. While the IB literature largely 
focuses on MNE strategies, this paper attempts to contribute to the IB landscape by 
focusing on suppliers’ strategies that have received little attention previously. This study 
makes a further contribution to the IB literature by integrating the concept of upgrading 
from GVC analysis into our analytical framework and linking it with the notion of 
knowledge transfer in a largely unexplored type of inter-firm relational context. This 
study also contributes to the GVC literature by opening up the black box of suppliers’ 
upgrading strategy (Marchi et al., 2014) and also highlighting the role of legal contracts 
in different forms of governance. The integration of the IB and GVC literature allows the 
paper to add to the recent interest in cross-disciplinary engagement from both of these 
domains (Johns et al., 2015). 
5.2 Practical implications 
This study identifies a number of challenges faced by suppliers in their attempts to 
develop the knowledge they need to upgrade. While it is not surprising that there is a 
limited transfer of tacit knowledge between MNE buyers and their suppliers, given the 
high degree of knowledge asymmetry, the non-contractual form of relationship explored 
in this study seems to have intensified this asymmetric relationship even further. The 
findings indicate that small suppliers with limited resources are only able to access 
publicly available information. The key sources of tacit knowledge available to the 
suppliers studied were their owners’ previous work experience and firm-level learning 
from mistakes and problem solving. They were too resource constrained to access other, 
more effective sources of tacit knowledge such as investing in overseas training for 
employees, hiring foreign consultants, and recruiting knowledgeable expatriates (cf. 
Fletcher and Harris, 2012). This finding further shows that, while it is necessary for 
suppliers to make idiosyncratic and transaction-specific investments (e.g. new 
machinery, building new compliant factories, productivity enhancement processes to 
meet delivery targets) to stay in business, such investments are rarely sufficient to 
overcome existing knowledge asymmetries in a meaningful way. As a result, small 
suppliers may be able to progress to the periphery of technological upgrading. However, 
pursuing economic upgrading of a higher level may not be possible for them without 
external institutional support.  
For instance, the analysis shows that all three case firms relied heavily on the 
BGMEA, which is currently the only support institution providing information and 
training to the 6000 garment manufacturers in Bangladesh. The BGMEA is an 
independent association of garment exporters and is not a public support institution 
(McKinsey, 2011). This clearly reinforces the need for the Bangladeshi government to 
provide more support to small garment producers. 
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5.3 Limitations and future research directions 
This study is exploratory in nature and thus the topic should be analysed in more  
detail. This study only examined small firms and large firms with more substantial 
resources may face different challenges and pursue somewhat different strategies to 
acquire/develop the knowledge necessary for economic upgrading. To this end, a 
comparative analysis might be conducted to find out whether firms of different sizes have 
different strategies for the acquisition of knowledge and different outcomes in terms of 
economic upgrading. Such studies might facilitate a better understanding of the 
constraints faced by both small and large firms in acquiring the knowledge required for 
upgrading.  
This paper has identified the need for the government to support small, resource-
constrained suppliers in order to facilitate their economic upgrading. To this end, future 
research may prove useful to investigate the barriers to the design and implementation of 
appropriate support institutions. Future research may also wish to determine the role of 
other environmental factors, such as the level of sophistication of customers in the local 
market, competition and capabilities in the backward-linkage industry.  
Acknowledgement 
Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), UK, who 
funded part of Rudolf Sinkovics’ time [grant number RES-075-25-0028], is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
References 
Almeida, P. and Phene, A. (2004) ‘Subsidiaries and knowledge creation: the influence of the  
MNC and host country on innovation’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 25, Nos. 8/9, 
pp.847–864. 
Andersson, U., Björkman, I. and Forsgren, M. (2005) ‘Managing subsidiary knowledge creation: 
the effect of control mechanisms on subsidiary local embeddedness’, International Business 
Review, Vol. 14, No. 5, pp.521–538. 
Barrientos, S., Gereffi, G. and Rossi, A. (2011) ‘Economic and social upgrading in global 
production networks: a new paradigm for a changing world’, International Labour Review, 
Vol. 150, Nos. 3–4, pp.319–340. 
BGMEA (2015) The Ready Made Garment Industry in Bangladesh, Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA). Available online at: http://www.bgmea. 
com.bd/home/about/AboutGarmentsIndustry (accessed on 17 July 2015). 
Bjorkman, I., Barner-Rasmussen, W. and Li, L. (2004) ‘Managing knowledge transfer in MNCs: 
the impact of headquarters control mechanisms’, Journal of International Business Studies, 
Vol. 35, No. 5, pp.443–455. 
Bojica, A.M. and Fuentes, M.D.M.F. (2012) ‘Knowledge acquisition and corporate 
entrepreneurship: insights from spanish SMEs in the ICT sector’, Journal of World Business, 
Vol. 47, No. 3, pp.397–408. 
Bresman, H., Birkinshaw, J. and Nobel, R. (1999) ‘Knowledge transfer in international 
acquisitions’, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp.439–462. 
Bresman, H., Birkinshaw, J. and Nobel, R. (2009) ‘Knowledge transfer in international 
acquisitions’, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp.5–20. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Supplier strategies to compensate for knowledge asymmetries 281    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Buckley, P.J. (2009) ‘The impact of the global factory on economic development’, Journal of 
World Business, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp.131–143. 
Buckley, P.J. and Carter, M.J. (2002) ‘Process and structure in knowledge management practices  
of British and US multinational enterprises’, Journal of International Management, Vol. 8, 
No. 1, pp.29–48. 
Coe, N.M., Dicken, P. and Hess, M. (2008) ‘Global production networks: realizing the potential’, 
Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp.271–295. 
Ernst, D. and Kim, L. (2002) ‘Global production networks, knowledge diffusion, and local 
capability formation’, Research Policy, Vol. 31, Nos. 8–9, pp.1417–1429. 
Fletcher, M. and Harris, S. (2012) ‘Knowledge acquisition for the internationalization of  
the smaller firm: content and sources’, International Business Review, Vol. 21, No. 4,  
pp.631–647. 
Foss, N.J. and Pedersen, T. (2002) ‘Transferring knowledge in MNCs: the role of sources  
of subsidiary knowledge and organizational context’, Journal of International Management, 
Vol. 8, No. 1, pp.49–67. 
Gereffi, G. (1999) ‘International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity chain’, 
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp.37–70. 
Gereffi, G. and Frederick, S. (2010) ‘The global apparel value chain, trade and the crisis: 
challenges and opportunities for developing countries’, in Cattaneo, O., Gereffi, G. and 
Staritz, C. (Eds): Global Value Chains in a Postcrisis World: A Development Perspective, 
World Bank, Washington, DC, pp.157–208. 
Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005) ‘The governance of global value chains’, Review 
of International Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp.78–104. 
Gereffi, G. and Lee, J. (2012) ‘Why the world suddenly cares about global supply chains’, Journal 
of Supply Chain Management, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp.24–32. 
Gereffi, G. and Memedovic, O. (2003) The Global Apparel Value Chain: What Prospects for 
Upgrading by Developing Countries, United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
Vienna, Vienna. 
Giroud, A. (2007) ‘MNEs vertical linkages: the experience of Vietnam after Malaysia’, 
International Business Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp.159–176. 
Giroud, A., Jindra, B. and Marek, P. (2012) ‘Heterogeneous FDI in transition economies – a novel 
approach to assess the developmental impact of backward linkages’, World Development,  
Vol. 40, No. 11, pp.2206–2220. 
Giroud, A. and Scott-Kennel, J. (2009) ‘MNE linkages in international business: a framework for 
analysis’, International Business Review, Vol. 18, No. 6, pp.555–566. 
Giuliani, E. and Macchi, C. (2014) ‘Multinational corporations’ economic and human rights 
impacts on developing countries: a review and research agenda’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp.479–517. 
Giuliani, E., Pietrobelli, C. and Rabellotti, R. (2005) ‘Upgrading in global value chains: lessons 
from Latin American clusters’, World Development, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp.549–573. 
Ho, M.H-W. and Wang, F. (2015) ‘Unpacking knowledge transfer and learning paradoxes in 
international strategic alliances: contextual differences matter’, International Business Review, 
Vol. 24, No. 2, pp.287–297. 
Huber, G.P. (1991) ‘Organizational learning: the contributing processes and the literatures’, 
Organization Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp.88–115. 
Humphrey, J. and Schmitz, H. (2002) ‘How does insertion in global value chains affect upgrading 
in industrial clusters?’, Regional Studies, Vol. 36, No. 9, pp.1017–1027. 
Johns, J., Buckley, P., Campling, L., Cook, G., Hess, M. and Sinkovics, R.R. (2015) ‘Geography 
and history matter: international business and economic geography perspectives on the spatial 
and historical development of multinational enterprises’, in Konara, P., Ha, Y.J., McDonald, 
F. and Wei, Y. (Eds): The Rise of Multinationals from Emerging Economies: Achieving a New 
Balance, Vol. 22, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK, pp.51–80. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   282 S.F. Hoque, N. Sinkovics and R.R. Sinkovics    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Khan, Z. and Nicholson, J.D. (2014) ‘An investigation of the cross-border supplier development 
process: problems and implications in an emerging economy’, International Business Review, 
Vol. 23, No. 6, pp.1212–1222. 
King, N. (2012) ‘Doing template analysis’, in Symon, G. and Cassell, C. (Eds): Qualitative 
Organizational Research: Core Methods and Current Challenges, Sage Publications Ltd., 
London, pp.426–450. 
Lee, J. and Gereffi, G. (2015) ‘Global value chains, rising power firms and economic and social 
upgrading’, Critical Perspectives on International Business, Vol. 11, Nos. 3/4, pp.319–339. 
Li, J.J., Poppo, L. and Zhou, K.Z. (2010) ‘Relational mechanisms, formal contracts, and local 
knowledge acquisition by international subsidiaries’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 31, 
No. 4, pp.349–370. 
Liu, C-L. (2012) ‘Knowledge mobility in cross-border buyer-supplier relationships’, Management 
International Review, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp.275–291. 
Liu, C-L. and Zhang, Y. (2014) ‘Learning process and capability formation in cross-border buyer–
supplier relationships: a qualitative case study of Taiwanese technological firms’, 
International Business Review, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp.718–730. 
Locke, R.M. (2013) The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a 
Global Economy, Cambridge University Press,New York. 
Lyles, M.A. and Salk, J.E. (2007) ‘Knowledge acquisition from foreign parents in international 
joint ventures: an empirical examination in the Hungarian context’, Journal of International 
Business Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp.3–18. 
Macneil, I.R. (1978) ‘Contracts: adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical, 
neoclassical, and relational contract law’, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 72,  
No. 6, pp.854–905. 
Macneil, I.R. (2000) ‘Relational contract theory: challenges and queries’, Northwestern University 
Law Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp.877–907. 
Madhok, A. and Tallman, S.B. (1998) ‘Resources, transactions and rents: managing value through 
interfirm collaborative relationships’, Organization Science, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp.326–339. 
Marchi, V.D., Maria, E.D. and Ponte, S. (2014) ‘Multinational firms and the management of global 
networks: insights from global value chain studies’, in Pedersen, T., Venzin, M., Devinney, 
T.M. and Tihanyi, L. (Eds): Orchestration of the Global Network Organization (Advances  
in International Management), Vol. 27, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley,  
pp.463–486. 
McKendrick, E. (2015) Contract Law, 11th ed., Palgrave, London. 
McKinsey (2011) Bangladesh’s Readymade Garments Landscape: The Challenge of Growth. 
Available online at: http://www.mckinsey.de/downloads/presse/2011/2011_McKinsey_ 
Bangladesh%20Case%20Study.pdf (accessed on 7 July 2015). 
Morrison, A., Pietrobelli, C. and Rabellotti, R. (2008) ‘Global value chains and technological 
capabilities: a framework to study learning and innovation in developing countries’, Oxford 
Development Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp.39–58. 
Mudambi, R. (2002) ‘Knowledge management in multinational firms’, Journal of International 
Management, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp.1–9. 
Mudambi, R. and Swift, T. (2011) ‘Leveraging knowledge and competencies across space: the next 
frontier in international business’, Journal of International Management, Vol. 17, No. 3, 
pp.186–189. 
Park, B.I. (2011) ‘Knowledge transfer capacity of multinational enterprises and technology 
acquisition in international joint ventures’, International Business Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 
pp.75–87. 
Park, B.I. and Choi, J. (2014) ‘Control mechanisms of MNEs and absorption of foreign technology 
in cross-border acquisitions’, International Business Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp.130–144. 
Pavlínek, P. and Ženka, J. (2011) ‘Upgrading in the automotive industry: firm-level evidence from 
Central Europe’, Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp.559–586. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Supplier strategies to compensate for knowledge asymmetries 283    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Pietrobelli, C. and Saliola, F. (2008) ‘Power relationships along the value chain: multinational 
firms, global buyers and performance of local suppliers’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 32, No. 6, pp.947–962. 
Ponte, S. and Gibbon, P. (2005) ‘Quality standards, conventions and the governance of global 
value chains’, Economy and Society, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp.1–31. 
Sinkovics, N., Sinkovics, R.R., Hoque, S. and Czaban, L. (2015) ‘A reconceptualization of social 
value creation as social constraint alleviation’, Critical Perspectives on International 
Business, Vol. 11, Nos. 3/4, pp.340–363. 
Sinkovics, N., Sinkovics, R.R. and Yamin, M. (2014) ‘The role of social value creation in business 
model formulation at the bottom of the pyramid – implications for MNEs?’, International 
Business Review, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp.692–707. 
Strange, R. and Newton, J. (2006) ‘Stephen Hymer and the externalization of production’, 
International Business Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp.180–193. 
Subramani, M.R. and Venkatraman, N. (2003) ‘Safeguarding investments in asymmetric 
interorganizational relationships: theory and evidence’, Academy of Management Journal, 
Vol. 46, No. 1, pp.46–62. 
Tokatli, N. (2006) ‘Asymmetrical power relations and upgrading among suppliers of  
global clothing brands: Hugo boss in turkey’, Journal of Economic Geography, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
pp.67–92. 
Wang, P., Tong, T.W. and Koh, C.P. (2004) ‘An integrated model of knowledge transfer from 
MNC parent to China subsidiary’, Journal of World Business, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp.168–182. 
Williamson, O.E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, The Free Press, New York. 
Williamson, O.E. (2008) ‘Outsourcing: transaction cost economics and supply chain management’, 
Journal of Supply Chain Management, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp.5–16. 
Zou, H. and Ghauri, P.N. (2008) ‘Learning through international acquisitions: the process  
of knowledge acquisition in China’, Management International Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, 
pp.207–226. 
